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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 133 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 23/12/1997 
Where it occurred: Kohai Nigar, Ward 6, 
Kandahar city 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five and a half years. He had attended a revision course 
three months previously and had been on leave 42 days before the accident. He was working 
on ground described as "hard agricultural land" [a photograph showed a deep excavation in 
compacted ground].  
The investigators decided that the victim got a detector reading and investigated it but found 
nothing. He checked with the detector and still got a reading, so squatted to prod thinking it 
was a fragment. The device which exploded was assumed to be an MUV fuze because of the 
presence of POMZ fragments in that minefield. 
The Team Leader said that the deminer was working properly and was investigating the 
same reading for the third time when his bayonet struck the fuze. He said the main cause of 
the accident was the hardness of the ground (which had been driven over by tanks). He said 
back-hoes or other techniques should be used on such hard ground. 
The Section Leader said the deminer was checking the reading for the third time when the 
accident occurred and that he was working properly. 
The victim said he was investigating the same reading for the third time when the accident 
occurred. He was working properly and the hard ground caused the accident. He 
recommended the use of back-hoes on such hard ground. 
The victim's partner said the victim was working lying prone and doing his job properly. The 
fuze was under pressure and exploded just by being touched so the deminer was not at fault. 
He recommended the back-hoe be used for excavating such sites. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was squatting when the ground was suitable for 
lying prone, and that he showed "poor judgement" by thinking the fuze was a fragment. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the team command group must make deminers lie 
prone to prod when the ground is suitable, that all readings should be treated as a mine, and 
that Section Leaders should supervise properly and enforce the prone prodding requirement. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 169 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
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See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The investigators summarised the victim's injuries as slight burns to his face, light abrasions 
to his eyelids and dust and earth in both eyes.  
A medic's sketch showed minor abrasions on the face. A photograph showed no obvious 
facial injury. 
The insurers were informed on 30th December 1997 that the victim had sustained eye injuries 
(foreign bodies both eyes) in an accident on 24th [sic] December 1997. [A UN MAC accident 
summary also changes the date to 24th December 1997.] 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
injuries show that the victim was not wearing his protective equipment (or not wearing it 
properly) and this error was not corrected. The inconsistencies in the statements from 
supervisors imply that some were lying, and the UN MAC's failure to address the problem of 
dishonesty among field supervisors represents a failure of management. 
The victim was prodding for something with very different dimensions from a mine, so may 
have been working as trained when the accident occurred [see Related papers]. For this 
reason, the secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable”. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for local conditions, or enforce 
their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
 
Related papers 
No other documents were made available. 
The belief that the device was a "fragment" may be misleading. An MUV fuze complete with 
detonator is 11cm (4.33") long and constitutes rather a large detector reading.  
The picture below is of an MUV fuze and detonator common in Afghanistan. It is possible that 
pressure applied with a bayonet in the wrong place could dislodge the pin easily – especially 
if it were already partly pulled. The victim was prodding for something with very different 
dimensions, so may have been working as trained when the accident occurred. 
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